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Executive Registry

W-2823

13 APR 1961

Honorable John J. McCloy
Adviser to the President on Disarmament
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

Your letter of 24 March requesting certain intelligence studies has been received, and I have directed the Deputy Director for Intelligence of this Agency to constitute the necessary task force to accomplish the studies.

We in intelligence fully appreciate the import to our national security of any nuclear test ban which may be realized, and we will be prepared to render prompt and thorough intelligence support to the United States Delegation to the Control Commission. It is my intention to discuss with you and, in due course, with the President the organizational and staffing arrangements for providing support of this type plus any other intelligence support to disarmament negotiations or realized treaties. In the meantime, we shall be accomplishing the studies you request.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director

Hand carried to
Mr. McCloy's office.
Rm 5930 E, Dept of
State.

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Revised: 0/DD/I: [] mhs

7 April 1961

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Originated by:

APR 7
1961

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CONCURRENCES:

APR 7
1961

Assistant Director/SI

APR 7
1961

Deputy Director (Intelligence)

White House

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AD/SI 145 Barton Hall	7 Apr 61

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Washington

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March 24 1961

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

Dear Mr. Dulles:

As you know, the American Delegation to the Nuclear Test Ban Conference has returned to Geneva with revised proposals which make the conclusion of a treaty at least possible. This possibility, of course, depends largely upon a movement by the Soviet Union toward accepting a reliable control and inspection system.

I believe that the prospects for a treaty, though far from assured, do call for a thoughtful and timely examination of requirements which would arise should this event transpire. In particular, present U.S. proposals and the draft treaty require that a Preparatory Commission shall come into existence one day after the signature of the treaty. This Commission will function until the ratification of the treaty and will be responsible for developing detailed recommendations for the installation and operation of a nuclear test ban control organization. It is therefore clear that various studies should be got under way in the near future which define and support anticipated U.S. proposals for installation and operation of the control system in the USSR, U.S., U.K. and other locations specified for Phase I of the installation schedule. Such proposals should take into account all relevant information and substantive capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community concerning the USSR and other treaty areas.

In this regard, you will recall that approximately 100 seismic events annually of magnitude 4.75 or greater will be eligible for

The Honorable
Allen Dulles,
Director,
Central Intelligence Agency.

C O P Y

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inspection within the USSR in accordance with the simplified criteria which only require a determination of equivalent yield and approximate time and location of the event. The choice of events to be inspected within an agreed quota, from among those declared to be eligible, must be largely determined on the basis of national intelligence data, including technical information. Once the choice has been made, inspection teams must be rapidly and comprehensively briefed in order that they will be fully informed about significant conditions in regions to which they will be going. Finally, the U.S. will be entirely dependent upon unilateral intelligence for indications of possible clandestine tests not detected by the international control system, e.g., decoupled underground and high altitude events.

Accordingly, I would like you to be responsible for the following studies which will be needed by 15 May:

1. Support measures the U.S. Intelligence Community should undertake for the U.S. Delegation at the Test Ban Control Commission which will supplement the effectiveness with which observance of treaty obligations are enforced, including:

a. Intelligence information which may clarify ambiguous data collected by the control organization indicating the occurrence of nuclear tests,

b. Intelligence information which may indicate the occurrence of nuclear tests not detected by the control organization, e.g., decoupled underground and high altitude tests,

c. Factors to be taken into consideration in deciding to request on-site inspection of suspicious events,

d. Information which should be available in the International Inspection Office or the U.S. Delegation at the Control Commission for briefing or otherwise facilitating the effective operation of on-site inspection activities.

2. Capabilities within the near future of the U.S. Intelligence Community, including its technical components, to implement the above measures, particularly,

a. Organization of existing information in a rapidly recoverable form, probably by means of electronic data processing systems,

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b. Organization of internal resources and procedures insuring that all newly acquired information relevant to foreign clandestine nuclear activities will flow rapidly to the basic fund of intelligence,

c. An intelligence unit, with the necessary logistical support, within the U.S. Delegation at the Control Commission responsible for keeping the U.S. Representative apprised of all significant intelligence development and to otherwise assist him,

[REDACTED]

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In planning for implementation of the above studies, it should be borne in mind that the draft treaty provides for a relatively brief preparatory period after treaty signature before installation of system elements is to commence. Accordingly, organization of implementational activities should proceed as nearly in step with development of the above studies as is feasible and prudent.


The foregoing studies are, of course, in addition to the responsibility now borne by your organization for the technical administration of the on-site inspection research portion of [REDACTED] I assume that results of activities in this area, including preparatory studies in anticipation of a treaty signature, will be contributed through administrative channels which have been provided for this purpose.

I would like to have Mr. Lloyd K. Belt of the U.S. Disarmament Administration function as our representative in all matters relating to the above studies and activities. Mr. Belt is located in Room 4930 NE, telephone EMley 3-6476.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN J. MCCLOY
Adviser to the President
on Disarmament

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7 APR 1961

BRIEF FOR: Director for Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Letter to Mr. John J. McCloy
Special Advisor to President on Disarmament

1. The attached letter to Mr. McCloy is in response to his letter of 24 March. He had requested a complete delineation of how and to what degree United States Intelligence would support the U.S. Delegation to a Control Commission. I have convened within the DDI area a task force to prepare the necessary studies. A representative from the DDP area is also participating with the group. I believe the studies will be completed and ready for delivery by 15 May. Prior to their transmittal it may be desirable to present these to the United States Intelligence Board.

25X1 2. Above and beyond this immediate response to Mr. McCloy, there is the broader question of how U.S. Intelligence will gear itself to support [] disarmament discussions and any treaties which may be realized. A recent request for much broader support than asked for in the 24 March letter from Mr. McCloy makes the breadth of this matter clear. I believe it will be necessary for you to make recommendations to the President on the assignment of responsibility for intelligence support [] very soon; and, together with Mr. Bissell, I shall be drafting the necessary staff papers and recommendations.

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[]
ROBERT AMORY, JR.
Deputy Director/Intelligence

6/24/2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Number 1 of 9 copies, Series A.

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MAR 24 1961

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 - b. Intelligence information which may indicate the occurrence of nuclear tests not detected by the control organization, e.g., decoupled underground and high altitude tests,
 - c. Factors to be taken into consideration in deciding to request on-site inspection of suspicious events,
 - d. Information which should be available in the International Inspection Office or the U.S. Delegation at the Control Commission for briefing or otherwise facilitating the effective operation of on-site inspection activities,
2. Capabilities within the near future of the U.S. Intelligence Community, including its technical components, to implement the above measures, particularly,
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- 3 -

b. Organization of internal resources and procedures insuring that all newly acquired information relevant to foreign clandestine nuclear activities will flow rapidly to the basic fund of intelligence,

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In planning for implementation of the above studies, it should be borne in mind that the draft treaty provides for a relatively brief preparatory period after treaty signature before installation of system elements is to commence. Accordingly, organization of implementational activities should proceed as nearly in step with development of the above studies as is feasible and prudent.

The foregoing studies are, of course, in addition to the responsibility now borne by your organization for the technical administration of the on-site inspection research portion of [redacted]. I assume that results of activities in this area, including preparatory studies in anticipation of a treaty signature, will be contributed through administrative channels which have been provided for this purpose.

I would like to have Mr. Lloyd K. Belt of the U.S. Disarmament Administration function as our representative in all matters relating to the above studies and activities. Mr. Belt is located in Room 4930 NS, telephone DUDLEY 3-6476.

Sincerely yours,



John J. McCloy
Adviser to the President
on Disarmament

SECRET

7 APR 1961


MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center
Assistant Director/General Reference
Assistant Director/Current Intelligence
Assistant Director/Research and Reports

SUBJECT : Intelligence Support of a Nuclear Test Ban

1. Mr. John J. McCloy, Special Adviser on Disarmament, has asked the Director to consider the problem of intelligence support for a possible Nuclear Test Ban. In particular, he has requested studies detailing the types of information that should be available to the U.S. Delegation to a Test Ban Control Commission and the organization and information handling systems such support would require. He has asked for these studies by May 15.

2. I believe that this request can best be answered by establishing rapidly a small group of working level people who can consider in detail type types and depth of information needed, and intelligence collection possibilities. Obviously this study will require very diverse talents.

3. Accordingly, I am asking you to provide an experienced person from your office to serve with this group. The Office of Scientific Intelligence has been following certain aspects of this problem for several years, and I have therefore, asked Dr. Scoville to nominate the chairman. Dr. Scoville will contact you soon with further details concerning the tasks to be accomplished and the types of people who can contribute most effectively.


ROBERT A. MCCLAY, JR.
Deputy Director/
Intelligence

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7 APR 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director/Plans
FROM : Deputy Director/Intelligence
SUBJECT : Intelligence Support of a Nuclear Test Ban

1. Mr. John J. McCloy, Special Advisor on Disarmament, has asked the Director to consider the problem of intelligence support for a possible Nuclear Test Ban. In particular, he has requested studies detailing the types of information that should be available to the U.S. Delegation to a Test Ban Control Commission, and the organization and information handling system such support would require. I have appended a copy of Mr. McCloy's letter.

2. I believe that this request can best be answered by establishing rapidly a small group of working level people who can consider in detail the types and depth of information needed, priorities, support services required, communications problems and intelligence collection possibilities. Accordingly, I have asked the several offices of the DD/I to provide experienced people for such a group under the chairmanship of the Office of Scientific Intelligence.

3. Clearly, it will be necessary to have a representative from DD/P in this group to provide guidance on those aspects of the problem which are unique to the DD/P and to keep the DD/P advised of the group's progress, problems and responsibilities.

4. I would appreciate it if you select a member of your staff who will contact Dr. Scoville's office in order that additional information on the work of this group and the type of people who will be involved can be provided.

ROBERT AMORY, JR.

ATTACHMENT:

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